Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

Clint Ketchum v. Bonn H. Lyon : Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Golden W. Robbins; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Ketchum v. Lyon, No. 12516 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5437

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

·' .·.
'. .. /J,t ,,..;

·'·

JM TBB

SUPREME COURT

'

OJ' rrBJI

STATB OF UTAH
CLINT KETCHUM,
Pl,ain,tiff and Respondent,

BONN H. LYON,
Defendant and Ap,,._,_

GOLDEN W. ROlllll
Attorne,y for,

Plaintiff-

705 Newtiou. BilfDt
Salt Lake City, UWl i

ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.

,
.

Salt Lake City, Utah

., .•.

Attorney for Defendant and AppeU,anl
1010 Keams Building
·.

·

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ______________

1
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 2-5
ARGUM:ENT ---------·--------------------------------------------------·····-··--5-12
POINT I. THE COURT FOUND IT WAS A
PLEDGE __ _____ __ ____ ____ ____ _____ ___ ________ ____ _______ ____________ ________ __ 5-8
POINT II. STATUTE OF LIM IT A TI ON S.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS __________________ 8-10
POINT III. LACHES ----------------------------------------------------10-12
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 12
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Campbell v. Peter, 108 U. 565, 162 P. 2d 754 --------------

5

John C. Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores, 279 P.
2d 700, 3 u. 2d 107 ---------------------------------------------------- 6-7
Nebeker v. Harvey, 21 U. 363, 60 P. 1029 --------------------

9

Nielsen v. Hyland, 51 U. 334, 170 P. 778 --------------------

9

Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P. 2nd 907, 22 Utah 2d 85 ----

7

Taylor Bros Co. v. Duden, 112 U. 436, 188 P. 2d 995

9

Watkins v. Jensen, 58 U. 13, 197 P. 222 ------------------------ 10
Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 110 P. 2d 566, 100
Utah 120 ----------------------------------------------------------------------

7

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Page
INDEX TO TEXT AND STATUTES

Pacific Digest, 101 P. 2d, Appeal and Error, Key 931
( 1)

------- --- ----- --- ----- ---- --- ---- ---- -------- --- ----- --- ---- -- ---- --- ---- --- ---

7

Pacific Digest, 101 P. 2d, Appeal and Error, Key 1010
( 1) -- ------- ---- ---------------- ------------------------- ----------------------- ---

7

54 C. J. S. Sec. 168, Page 125 ------------------------------------------ 10
49 C. J. Pledges, Sec. 199, Page 978 ____________________________ 10, 11
72 C. J. S. Pledges, Section 51, Page 95 ------------------------ 11
Utah Code, 78-12-23 ----------------------------------------------------------

8

Utah Code, 78-12-25 ----------------------------------------------------------

8

Utah Code, 78-12-26 ---------------------------------------------------------- 8, 9

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STA'IE OF UTAH
CLINT KETCHUM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

I

Case No.

12516

BONN H. LYON,
Defendant and Appellant. .

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in replevin (claim and delivery)
by Respondent, Plaintiff below, for stock pledged. After
the amount due on the pledge was tendered defendant
refused to deliver the stock, and this action in replevin
was filed for possession of the stock.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The replevin case was tried in the District Court
before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. Judgment was
granted in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
for the possession of 67,200 shares of Turner Uranium
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Corporation stock and defendant was entitled to $86.00,
the amount of the loan and interest, which money was
paid into court by the plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and respondent request the court to affirm
the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, appellant has misstated the facts and
sets out his contention as being facts which they are not,
and therefore plaintiff makes his own statement of facts.
That on March 8, 1961 plaintiff was the owner of
67,200 shares of Turner Uranium Corporation stock.
About March 8, 1961 plaintiff called defendant and asked
him to come to his hotel room at the Moxum Hotel, which
defendant did (Tr. 14). Plaintiff said he needed $50.00,
could defendant let him have it. Defendant said no he
couldn't let him have fifty dollars, he couldn't afford it.
Plaintiff said he had that Turner stock he would put up,
(Tr. 28) which stock Bonn Lyon had in his possession
(Tr. 30). Defendant had the stock because the files of
the corporation were left in defendant's hands when the
president of Turner Uranium was transferred out of the
state and the directors elected the defendant president,
and the stock came with the records of the company (Tr.
30-31).
The defendant loaned to plaintiff $50.00 and a memorandum was made, (Pl) which sets out the amount and
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number of each certificate. It further states 67,200 shares
of stocl{ placed with Bonn H. Lyon for $50.00 deposit
3/8/61. There is written in plaintiff's handwriting rec'd
3/8/61 (signed) Clint Ketchum. There is also the following written on exhibit Pl the words: $4.00 Yr. X 9=
$"(', 00
' ; 1..).

•

At that time plaintiff was living in Denver and later
moved to California. He was in Salt Lake a time or two
and tried to get in touch with the defendant, but the defendant was either out of town or wasn't at home (Tr.
20).
Plaintiff contacted defendant the first part of 1970
by telephone. Plaintiff told him that he was back in Salt
Lake and he wanted to pay him what he owed him plus
interest. Defendant then said he didn't know how much
the interest amounted to. He said he will have to get
out the file and see what he could find, and the defendant
was to call plaintiff (Tr. 15). Three or four days later
defendant told plaintiff the statute of limitations had run
out and he wasn't going to accept the money or he said:
"If you bring any money, bring it in cash, but I am not
going to accept any money because I am not going to give
you the stock" (Tr. 16). Thereafter plaintiff said he was
going to sue him if he didn't give him the stock.
Thereafter plaintiff's attorney on January 29, 1970
made a demand for the stock. Defendant's attorney responded that they weren't going to deliver it (Exhibit 3P
and 4D).
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The plaintiff contended that it was a pledge. The
defendant contended that it was a sale, and the court
made the following findings (Tr. 37-38):
1. That on or about the 8th day of March, 1961, the
defendant loaned to the plaintiff $50.00 with no date for
repayment and that to secure said loan the plaintiff delivered to the defendant 67,200 shares of the stock of the
Turner Uranium, certificate numbers and amounts as follows:
No. 252

10,000 shares

No.160

4,000 shares

253

10,000 shares

1

4,000 shares

254

10,000 shares

2

4,000 shares

255

3,600 shares

3

4,000 shares

158

4,000 shares

4

4,000 shares

159

4,000 shares

251

5,600 shares

2. That the plaintiff tendered to the defendant the
sum of $50.00 plus all accrued interest and demanded the
return of the stock. That said demand was made in January of 1970 and a further demand was made by plaintiff's attorney by letter on January 29, 1970. That the
defendant refused to deliver said stock.
3. That the defendant, in open court, promised to
deliver to the clerk of the court the original stock certificates amounting to 67,200 shares.
The Court then made Conclusions and then entered
Judgment that the plaintiff was the owner of 67,200
shares of Turner Uranium Corporation stock, the stock
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which was to be delivered by the defendant and put in
evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT FOUND IT WAS A PLEDGE.
Evidence was introduced and upon the evidence that
was introduced the court found that the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant was a pledge. We have
set out the court's findings above in our Statement of
Facts. The shares were endorsed by plaintiff and a written memorandum was made by the defendant stating
67,200 shares of stock placed with B. H. Lyon for $50.00
deposit and there was written $4.00 yr. X 9=$36.00 (Pl)
and Mr. Ketchum's testimony about the transaction (Tr.
13-20). If it had been a sale there would have been no
necessity for such a writing. The fact is that the court
found against defendant on the evidence and held it to
be a pledge.
The court in the case of Campbell v. Peter, 108 U.
565, 162 P. 2d 754, defines pledges. On page 756 of the
Pacific, second column, 3rd paragraph, the court states:
"However, as we have stated above, an essential
element of a pledge is the possession of the pledged
property by the pledgee, and he is entitled to retain this possession until the objects for which the
property was pledged have been fully accomplished.. As stated in 41 Am. Jur., Pledge and
Collateral Security, Sec. 99: * * *
And he is not required to return the security before bringing suit on the claim secured, in the ab-
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sence of a special contract to that effect, although
when that claim is satisfied he may be compelled
to release or reassign the collaterals. * * *"
The court stated on page 38 of the Transcript:
"THE COURT: Well, I'm going to interpret
it as a calculation of interest - '$4 a year at 9
was $36.00,' which is a calculation of intere3t and
is based upon a loan; I think the inference is justified and that it was based upon the loan of fifty
dollars because it tallies right out - fifty dollars
a year at eight percent for nine years would deliver thirty-six dollars, as interest."
"The most telling words on this document seems
to be 'stock placed with Lyon for $50 deposit'
which indicates a security arrangement, rather
than a sale" (Tr. 34).
"THE COURT: He (Mr. Ketchum) was here a
couple of times: he said he called him. His words
'Stock placed with B. H. Lyon with fifty dollar
deposit,' in Mr. Lyon's own handwriting seems to
me to carry the burden of proof this was a security transaction" (Tr. 39).
"THE COURT: Talking about circumstantial evidence, compared with direct evidence. The direct
evidence of thie document, in Mr. Lyon's handwriting, 'shares of stock' - '67,200 shares of stock
placed with B. H. Lyon for $50 deposit,' is direct
evidence, which seems to outweigh the conflicts
in the circumstances; and the ruling of the court
is, this was a security instrument. Title to the
stock did not pass to Mr. Lyon" (Tr. 40).
There are numerous cases which hold that the court
will not disturb the findings of the trial court. A good
statement of this rule is found in the case of John C.
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Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores, 279 P. 2d 700, 3 U.
2d 107, in v,rhich the court sets out in paragraph 4 on page
703 of the Pacific, 1st column:
"The defendant De Jay having prevailed, is entitled to have us view the evidence and every fair
inference and intendment arising therefrom in the
light most favorable to it. And if when so regarded, there is any substantial evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, any reasonable basis in the evidence, to support the finding made by the trial
court, it will not be disturbed."
This is headnote No. 4 Appeal and Error, Key 931
(1) and 1010 (1) of the Pacific Digest, 101 P. 2d and on
pages 765 to 804 and the annual pocket parts page 193
to 203 there are 31 Utah cases annotated and we quote
from Pacific Digest 2, page 196 of the pocket part, the case
of Sullivan v. Turner, as follows:
"Utah 1968. When trial judge has made findings
of fact and entered judgment thereon, they are
entitled to presumption of correctness, and, on
appeal, the evidence will be surveyed in light
favorable to them, and they will not be overturned
if there is any reasonable basis in evidence to support them. - Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P. 2d 907,
22 Utah 2d 85."
Under headnote 1010 (1) mentioned above there are 37
Utah cases and as a sample we quote from the Pacific
Digest 3, at page 375 as follows:
"Utah. Where trial court's findings of fact is based
upon sufficient evidence, Supreme Court will not
reverse it, even if inclined to arrive at a different
conclusion than trial judge. - Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 110 P. 2d 566, 100 Utah 120."
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POINT II.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The defendant cites two sections of the Utah Code,
78-12-23 and 78-12-25. Section 78-12-23 is as follows:
"78-12-23 Within Six Years. (1) An action for the mesne profits of real property.
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing,
except those mentioned in the preceding section."
Section 78-12-25 is as follows:
"Within Four Years. (1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
also on an open account for goods, wares and merchandise, and for any article charged in a store
account· * * *
'
(2) An action for relief not otherwise provided
for by law."
This is an action of replevin (claim and delivery)
for the possession of personal property and is covered by
Section 78-12-26 subsection 2, which is as follows:
Section 78-12-26:
"Within Three Years. * * * ( 2) An action for taking, detaining or
injuring personal property, including actions for
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specific recovery thereof;"
Under Section 78-12-26 is annotated the case of Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112 U. 436, 188 P. 2d 995, and we
quote from the annotation:
"and seller's cause of action for detaining personal property under subdivision 2 of former 1042-24 would not arise until third person refused
to surrender possession after request, notice or demand therefore, and period of limitations would
not commence to run until such right of action
accrued."
The following cases which are annotated under that
section hold that there is no cause of action until the demand is made and refused.

Nebeker v. Harvey, 21 U. 363, 60 P. 1029, and on page
1031 end of first column we quote:
"The cause of action arose when and where such
demand was made and the refusal occurred."
Nielsen v. Hyland, 51 U. 334, 170 P. 778 and on page
780 the court says:
"It is undoubtedly elementary doctrine in the law
of replevin that, where a person comes lawfully
into possession of another's property, a demand
by the person entitled thereto must first be made
before an action can be brought for its recovery,
unless other facts and circumstances are shown
to exist which in law are sufficient to obviate the
necessity of a demand. For instance, the attitude
of a party concerning the property in dispute may
be such as to show conclusively that any demand
upon him for possession thereof would be futile
and unavailing."
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The case of Watkins v. Jensen, 58 U. 13, 197 P. 222,
court states on page 224 of the Pacific:
"2-4. It may, without much qualification, be
stated as a general rule that when anyone comes
rightfully into possession of personal property belonging to another before the latter may institute
an action to recover possession of such property,
or its value, a demand upon the former for its return is necessary, unless the subsequent conduct
of the defendant is such that it is apparent that
such demand, if made, would have been unavailing."
See also 54 C. J. S. 168, page 125, second column:
"(3) Trover and Conversion. * * * Ordinarily a cause of action for trover and
accrues at, and limitations begin to run from the
date of the conversion."

POINT III.

LA CHES
Laches does not apply in this case because the suit
was brought within a very short time, four months after
the demand and refusal to deliver the stock and the doctrine of laches has no bearing upon any case where there
is just the mere passing of time. The doctrine of !aches
is only effective where there is some reason other than
the passing of time which would shorten the time for the
statute of limitations to run.
49 C. J. Pledges, Sec. 199, page 978, and we quote
from page 978:
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"199 (d) Limitations and Laches. Mere lapse of
time after the maturity of the principal obligation
does not bar the pledgor's right to redeem * * *
Limitations against the right to redeem do not
run from the maturity of the debt, but only from
the time demand is made on the pledgor to redeem * * *"
To the same effect is 72 C. J. S. Pledges, Section 51,
page 95:
"Mere lapse of time after the maturity of the principal obligation does not bar the pledgor's right
to redeem, 61."
The court found it to be a pledge and under 49 C. J.
at page 974, Section 187, it states:
"(2) Limitations and Laches. Although the statute of limitations begins to run against the principal debt secured from the time of its maturity,
the statute does not begin to run against the right
of the pledgor to sue for failures to return the
collateral until its conversion by the pledgee."
We have no quarrel with the abstract principal
of the law as set out in the cases cited by the defendant
under Point III, but those cases are just not in point or
applicable to the facts in the instant case.
All the arguments on limitation also apply to
laches and furthermore this is not an equity case, it is
a law case replevin.
The defendant in his Brief quoted certain statements
made by the court at the conclusion of the case when he
was discussing the matter with counsels.
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But we call the court's attention to the part of the
court's statement that we have quoted in paragraph I of
this Brief, and all of the court's statements which are at
the end of the transcript, and the court's conclusion on
page 40 of the transcript that on the direct evidence he
ruled it was a security instrument and that the title did
not pass to Mr. Lyon. Then the court made its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. This was the final conclusion of the
Judge on the evidence.
CONCLUSION
This is an action for claim and delivery. The court
found against the defendant on the question of fact and
held that it was a pledge. The statute of limitations and
!aches did not run because there is no running on the
statute until the demand is made. The demand was made
in January of 1970 and the suit was commenced May 11,
1970.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS
Attorney for
Plaintiff and Respondent
705 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

